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16November2023|1:40PMESTOil
Analyst2024OilOutlook:RobustReturnsintheOPECRangennOilpricesaredownslightlythisyeardespitedemandexceedingouroptimisticexpectations.Non-coreOPECsupplyhasbeenmuch
strongerthanexpected,partlyoffsetby
OPECcuts.
We
believethatone-offfactorsdrove
thesupplybeats,concentratedintheUS(easingconstraints),RussiaandIran(policy).DaanStruyven+1(212)357-4172|daan.struyven@GoldmanSachs&Co.LLCCallumBruce,CFA+1(212)902-3053|callum.bruce@GoldmanSachs&Co.LLCWe
expectdemandgrowthtoremainsolidandcoreOPECsupplytoremainlowin2024.
We
thusexpecttheoilmarkettotightenatamoderatepace,butpreservesigni?cantsparecapacitytohandletighteningshocks,which
effectivelydelaysthesupercycle.YuliaZhestkovaGrigsby+1(646)446-3905|yulia.grigsby@GoldmanSachs&Co.LLCBlakeWoods+1(972)368-9739|blake.woods@GoldmanSachs&Co.LLCnnWe
believethatOPECwillensureBrentina$80-$100rangeby
leveragingitspricingpower,
witha$80?oorfromtheOPECput,anda$100
ceilingfromsparecapacity.
Whilehighernon-OPECsupplyorlower
GDParedownsideriskstoprices,we
estimatethatBrentwouldremaincloseto$80unlessOPECbecamelessassertive.Thisrangeshouldoffer
robustspot(15%
over
12M)
andcarry(12%)
returns,andwe
alsoseehedgingvalueagainstgeopoliticalsupplyshocks.We
expectthata0.7mb/dde?citwillraiseBrenttoa2024averageof$92/bbl.We
seesolid1.6mb/d
demandgrowthgivensolidGDPgrowth,structuralEMincreases,andajetfuelrecovery.USsupplygrowthissettoslowgivenfallingrigs,capitaldiscipline,andsoft
productivity.
We
assumeagradualunwindoftheextraSaudicut,andextendedgroupcutsbecausetheysupportrevenues.nnWhilethereisamplesparecapacityinoilproduction,we
expectre?ningtoremainstructurallytight.
We
thusexpectcomplexre?nerymarginstorise,especiallyfor
gasolineashighoctaneinputsgetscarceagaininsummer.Top
trades:OPEC
Range:Pro?t
ifJun24Brentisabove
75;shortput,longcallspread2024
De?cits:
Long
Aug24/Sep24BrenttimespreadSummer
GasolineTightness:LongSum24EuropeGasoline-BrentcrackThisreportisintendedfor
distributiontoGSinstitutionalclientsonly.Investorsshouldconsiderthisreportasonlyasinglefactorinmakingtheirinvestmentdecision.For
Reg
ACcerti?cationandotherimportantdisclosures,seetheDisclosure
Appendix,orgoto/research/hedge.html.GoldmanSachsOilAnalystWeExpect
Oil
Prices
in
a
$80-100
Range$/bbl$/bbl140BrentPrice
with
GSForecast140Realized
BrentPriceForecast12012010080FuturesLikely
Range:
$80-10010080604020604020Jan-18Jan-19Jan-20Jan-21Jan-22Jan-23Jan-24Jan-25Jan-26Source:ICE,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch16November20232GoldmanSachsOilAnalyst2024Outlook:RobustReturnsintheOPECRangeFollowingthelatestselloff,
Brentoilpricesaredownslightlyyear-to-date
despitedemandexceedingeven
ourown
optimisticexpectations.Infact,we
estimatethatoildemandgrowthof2.5mb/dthisyearisontrack
toexceedtheIEAandeven
ourownoptimisticexpectationsasofayearagoby
800
and500kb/d,respectively(Exhibit
1,leftpanel).
Thekey
surprisehasbeenmuch
strongerthanexpectednoncoreOPECproduction,partlyoffsetby
coreOPECsupplycuts.We
believethattwooneoff
factorsdrove
theupsidesurprisestosupplyoutsideofcoreOPEC,concentratedamongafew
countries.First,thepost-pandemiceasinginsupplyconstraintsfor
rigs,parts,andworkers,andrelatedef?ciencygainshave
providedaone-timeboosttoUSproductiongrowth.1
Second,supplyfromcertainsanctionedeconomieshasexceededexpectationsin2023as
Westernpolicymakersfoughttheenergy
crisiswithapricecapkeepingRussianbarrelsonthemarketwhilerisingIranianexports
unlocked
productivecapacity.Exhibit
1:
Upside
Surprises
in
2023
To
Oil
Demand
and
Non-OPEC
SupplySurprises
to
2023
Oil
Demand
and
Supply
Growth
(vs.
GS
End-2022
Expectations)kb/d600kb/dkb/dkb/d1,600Demand
GrowthSupply
Growth600
1,600Total
SurpriseTotal
SurpriseDownsideSurpriseUpsideSurprise50040030020010005001,2001,2008004000UpsideSurprise40080030040002001000OECD
DemandNon-OECD
DemandGlobal
DemandSource:IEA,Kpler,
JODI,EIA,NationalSources,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearchAs
bothfactorsareunlikelytoboostsupplygrowthmuch
further,
we
expectsupplygrowthoutsidecoreOPECtoslowto1.5mb/d
in2024(vs.2.6mb/din2023),especiallyintheUS.
We,
however,
expectdemandgrowthtoremainsolid(1.6mb/d
yoy)
andcoreOPECsupplytoremainlow
in2024(-0.3mb/dyoy),
aswe
believethatOPEC’s
moreassertivemarketmanagementisstructural.Onnet,we
expectamoderate0.7mb/dde?citin2024,slightlywiderthanthe0.3mb/dde?citin2023.We
thusexpecttheoilmarket—whichisnow
onlyslightlytighterthanusualbasedonthelevel
ofOECDcommercialstocks—totightenatamoderatepace,butpreservesigni?cantsparecapacitytohandlenear-term
tighteningshocks.
Whilethisspare1Similarly,faster-than-expectedexecutiondrovethe2023supplybeatinBrazil.16November20233GoldmanSachsOilAnalystcapacityeffectively
delaysthenextoilsupercycle,itdoesn’t
necessarilypreventit,givenhow
tightlong-termsupplydriversoffuturetightness(e.g.capex)stilllook(Exhibit2).Exhibit
2:
WeExpect
the
Oil
Market
to
Tighten
in
2024
But
to
Preserve
Signi?cant
Spare
CapacitySource:IEA,Platts,OPEC,EIA,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch16November20234GoldmanSachsOilAnalystThe
OPEC
RangeWe
believethatOPECwillensurethatBrentoilpricesendupina$80-$100rangein2024by
ensuringamoderatede?citandleveragingitspricing
power.
Thisrangeshouldoffer
investorsrobustspotandcarryreturnsinmostscenarios.
Atthesametime,wealsoseehedging
valueinoilinriskscenarioswithgeopoliticallydrivensupplydisruptions,whereriskassetsperformpoorly.Exhibit
3:
WeExpect
Oil
Prices
to
Stay
in
a
$80-100
Range$/bbl140$/bbl140BrentPrice
with
GSForecastRealized
BrentPriceForecast1201008012010080FuturesLikely
Range:
$80-100606040402020Jan-18Jan-19Jan-20Jan-21Jan-22Jan-23Jan-24Jan-25Jan-26Source:ICE,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearchA
$80
Floor
Under
BrentWe
believethatBrentisunlikelytosustainablydropbelow$80/bblnextyearfor
threereasons.First,theOPECputislikelytostayinplace.
ThecutsinOctober2022,
AprilandJune2023,andtheSeptemberextensionoftheextraSaudicutsuggestthattheOPECputsitsat$80to$85/bbl(Exhibit
4).
Whiletheriseinsparecapacityimpliesthatthisputislessstrongthanayearago,we
believethatasustaineddropbelow$80wouldlikelyleadOPEC+tobringback
barrelsmoreslowly.Second,theglobaleconomyisapproachingasoft
landing,wherecorein?ationreturnstotargetwithlimiteddamagetolabororoildemand.Third,USnetpublicandprivatedemandfor
oilriseswhenpricesfall.
TheUSDepartmentofEnergyreiterateditscommitmenttoreplenishtheSPRasanincrementalprice-sensitivebuyer,
andaimstopurchaseupto6mbofoilinJanuaryatWTIof$79/bblorbelow.Andwe
estimatethata10%
oilpricedecreaselowersUSliquidssupplyby
around1%or200kb/d.16November20235GoldmanSachsOilAnalystExhibit
4:
The
OPEC
Put
Currently
Appears
to
Sit
Around
$80
to
$85/bbl$/bbl$/bbl100BrentOilPrice
onFriday
Preceding
OPECProduction
Cut(orExtension
ofCut)10090807060504030201009080706050403020100Mar
Jun
Nov
Mar
Mar
Mar
Dec
Sep
Feb
Dec
Sep
Dec
Oct
Dec
Sep
Nov
Dec
Dec
Mar
Apr
Oct
Apr
Jun
Sep30
24
26
23
29
17
12
24
10
10
11
14
24
17
28
30765952451998
1998
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2004
2006
2006
2008
2008201620162018
2019
2020
2020
2022
2023
2023
2023OPEC
AnnouncementDateGreenbarsrefertotheunilateralSaudicutoritsextension.Source:OPEC,ICE,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearchA
$100
Cap
on
BrentWe
believethatBrentisunlikelytosustainablyexceedaround$100/bblnextyearforthreereasons.First,highsparecapacityof6mb/dlimitstheupsidetolong-datedoilprices(Exhibit
5,left
panel).
Withamplesparecapacity,long-datedpricesdonotneedtoincreasetoencouragefastergrowthinlong-cycleprojects,andwe
stillestimatethefairvaluefor36mBrentat$74/bbl.Second,OPECisunlikelytopushtimespreadstoextremelevels,which
wouldreducelong-termresidualdemandfor
OPECbarrels.Speci?cally,we
?ndthatthe2022energycrisisboostedlong-runnon-OPECsupplyviaareturntooffshoregrowth,andloweredlong-runoildemandviainvestmentinalternativestooil,includingEVs.Third,thedestockinginChinacrudeinventoriesandthehittocrudedemandfromerodingre?nerymarginsfollowingtheriseinBrenttonearly$100/bblinlateSeptemberillustrateprice-elasticcrudedemandfromChinaandre?nersasakey
balancingmechanism.16November20236GoldmanSachsOilAnalystExhibit
5:
Elevated
Spare
Capacity
and
China
Destocking
Put
a
Cap
on
Oil
PricesOPEC
exIran
Spare
Capacity$/bbl70mb60mb/d12mb/d12108Brent:
15-Day
Lag(left,inverted)1087580859095China
Inventories:60-Day
Change(right)402006644-20-4022HighPriceChinaDestocking00Jan-70Jan-80Jan-90Jan-00Jan-10Jan-20100Jan-23-60Mar-23May-23Jul-23Sep-23Nov-23Source:Platts,IEA,OPEC,EIA,Kpler,
ICE,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearchAs
Brentpricesarelikelytorecovertotheupperhalfofthe80-100
range,oilshouldoffer
robustspotreturns.
We
alsobelievethatOPECwillpursuebackwardation,andanticipatethatanelevated12%
rollorcarryreturnwillbealargecontributortoourforecastofa36%totalreturnfor
Brentover
thenext12M.
We
nextreviewthekeydriversofourforecastofamoderatede?citin2024.Exhibit
6:
WeForecast
Robust
Returns
From
Investing
in
Brent
Futures
From
Price
Appreciation
and
RollReturnPercent40%PercentDecomposition
ofBrentReturns40%35%30%25%20%15%10%5%CollateralReturnRollReturn35%30%25%20%15%10%5%PriceReturnTotal
Return0%0%3m6m12mSource:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch16November20237GoldmanSachsOilAnalystA
Moderate
De?cit
in
2024We
expectthatrobustdemand,slowingUSsupplygrowth,andlower
OPECsupplyforlongerwillresultinamoderate0.7mb/d2024de?cit.
As
aresult,we
expectthatgentleinventorydeclines(Exhibit
7)willraisetimespreadsandBrenttoapeakof$95/bblbyAugust2024,withthe2024averageat$92/bbl.2Exhibit
7:
WeForecast
Gentle
Inventory
Declines
in
2024Source:IEA,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearchDe?cit
Driver
#1:
Robust
Demand
GrowthWe
seesolid1.6mb/d
oildemandgrowthin2024givensolidglobalGDPgrowth,structuralEMincreases,andanongoingjetfuelrecovery.Oureconomistsforecastabove-consensusglobalGDPgrowthof2.6%basedonstrongincomegrowth,asmallerdragfrommonetaryand?scaltightening,arecoveryinmanufacturingactivity,andanincreasedwillingnessofcentralbankstodeliverinsurancecuts.ThisrelativelyoptimisticviewonGDPisakey
inputintoouroildemandmodels.EMswithstructurallypositivedemandtrendsdriveourforecastof1.4mb/d
2024Q4-Q4growth,includingChina(450kb/d),India(300kb/d),theMiddleEast(150kb/d),andothernon-OECD
Asia(200kb/d).2We
havewidenedour
WTI-Brentdifferentialslightlyfrom$3.8/bblto$4.4/bbl,re?ectingtherallyindirtyfreightmarketsonapotentiallystricterenforcementoftheRussianpricecap.16November20238GoldmanSachsOilAnalystExhibit
8:
WeLook
for
Firm
2024
Oil
Demand
Growth
in
EMsmb/dmb/d3Cumulative
Change
inOilDemand
Since
2023Q43221100-1-2-3-4-1-2-3ChinaIndiaMiddle
EastRest
ofNon-OECDRest
ofOECDUSOECD
EuropeTotal
Change
in
Oil
Demand-4Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q42022202320242025Source:IEA,Kpler,
JODI,EIA,NationalSources,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearchByproduct,we
forecastanotheryearofsolidjetfueldemandgrowthof0.6mb/d,andapickup
ingrowthfor
thepetchemorientedLPGandnaphthaproductsto0.5mb/d(Exhibit
9).
We
stillseesomeroomfor
post-pandemicrecoveryininternational
Asia?ights,withglobaljetfueldemandin2023Q3still0.7mb/dbelowits2019Q3
level.
Weexpectdemandfor
petchem-orientedproductstore-acceleratetowardsitssolidstructuraltrendasthedestocking
headwindfadeswithanormalizationininventory-to-salesratiosandinterestrates.Exhibit
9:
WeExpect
Jet
Fuel
and
Petrochemical
Products
(LPG
&
Naphtha)
to
Drive
Solid
2024
DemandGrowth
of
1.6mb/dmb/d3.0mb/d3.0OilDemandGrowthbyProductOtherProductsGas/DieselOil2.52.01.51.00.50.0-0.52.52.01.51.00.50.0-0.5MotorGasolineLPG&
NaphthaJet
Fuel&
Kerosene2015-192022202320242025Average
ChangeSource:IEA,JODI,EIA,NationalSources,ICIS,Kpler,
HaverAnalytics,ICE,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch16November20239GoldmanSachsOilAnalystDe?cit
Driver
#2:
Slowing
US
Supply
GrowthWe
expectsupplygrowthoutsidecoreOPECtoslowdownto1.5mb/d
in2024(from2.6mb/din2023).We
especiallylookfor
amoderationintotalliquidssupplygrowthintheUSto530kb/d(vs.1.4mb/d),
andBrazilto220kb/d(vs.0.4mb/d).Despitethisslowdown,the
Americasaresettocontinuetodriveglobalsupplygrowthin2024withaccelerationsinGuyana(180kb/d),andCanada(150kb/d).Exhibit
10:
WeForecast
a
Moderation
in
US
TotalLiquids
Supply
Growth
to
0.5mb/d
in
2024mb/d1.5mb/d1.5USLiquids
Supply
GrowthOtherCrude1.31.00.80.50.30.0-0.31.31.00.80.50.30.0-0.320212022202320242025Source:IEA,EIA,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearchWe
expectUSliquidssupplygrowthtoslowfor
threereasons.3First,theUSoilrigcounthascontinueditssurprisingdescent,andisnow
down21%fromthelate2022peak.3OnaQ4-Q4basis,our2024USsupplygrowthforecastis360kb/dwithcontributionsof250kb/dfromcrude,and130kb/dfromNGLs.16November202310GoldmanSachsOilAnalystExhibit
11:
The
US
Rig
Count
Is
Down
21%
Since
Late
2022;
Public
Producers
Are
Signaling
a
Production
Slowdownkb/d250US
Crude
Production
YoY
GrowthbyPublic
Independent
E&Ps
Under
GS
Coveragekb/d250OtherDiamondback2001501005020015010050EOG
ResourcesPioneerConocoPhillips00202320242025EstimateEstimateEstimateSource:BakerHughes,HaverAnalytics,Companydata,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearchSecond,USproducersremaincapitaldisciplined.USpublicindependent?rmsarestickingtothemoderatesingledigitgrowthtargetsannouncedin2020-2021.
Ourenergyequityanalystsexpectcrudeproductiongrowthby
theindependentUSE&PsunderGScoveragetoslowfromaround235kb/din2023to135kb/din2024(Exhibit
11,rightpanel).Reinvestmentrates—capexasashareofoperatingcash?ow—ofpublicproducersremainina40-60%range,wellbelowthehistoricalaverage(Exhibit
12,leftpanel).Third,underlyingwellproductivityinthePermianbasin(thekey
USgrowthengine)hasstoppedincreasing,re?ectinganoffsetbetweendeterioratingrock
qualityandimprovingtechnology(Exhibit
12,rightpanel).Exhibit
12:
US
Public
Producers
Remain
Capital
Disciplined;
Underlying
Well
Productivity
Has
Stopped
IncreasingReinvestmentRate:
Capex
asa
Share
of
Operating
Cash
Flowof
USPublic
Oil
ProducersPermian
Wells:
Average
First6
MonthProduction
Adjusted
by
Lateral
Lengthkb/1,000ft14kb/1000ft14Percent160Percent160Estimate1210812108140120100801401201008066606044404020202200002000200420082012201620202024Source:HaverAnalytics,Companydata,Enverus,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch16November202311GoldmanSachsOilAnalystDe?cit
Driver
#3:
Lower
OPEC
Supply
for
LongerWe
believethattheOPEC+supplycutssincelate2022re?ectastructuralshift
toamoreassertiveapproachofkeepinginventorieslow,
andpursuingbackwardation.4Becauseofthereducednon-OPECsupplyresponsetoproductioncuts,we
estimatethatOPECgroupcutsnow
boostSaudioilpro?ts.
As
aresult,Saudi
Arabiaandtheother8OPEC+countries,which
cutproductionby
1.7mb/d
in
April,arelikelytokeeptheirgroupcutfullyinplacein2024.We
assumethatSaudi
Arabiaunwindstheextra1mb/dunilateralcutonlygraduallystartingin2024Q3by
0.25mb/deverytwomonthsbecauseitsappearsdeterminedtolower
inventoriesandsupportelevatedfundingneeds.Ourforecastfor
low
OPECsupplyisalsoconsistentwithourstatistical
?ndingthatthegroupisinnorushtoboostproductionbecausecommercialOECDstocks
remainonlyslightlybelowtheirhistoricalaverage.Exhibit
13:
Lower
Saudi
Crude
Supply
For
LongerSource:OPEC,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch4PursuingbackwardationisgenerallyinOPEC’sinterestforthreereasons.First,itpreservestheoptionvalueofsparecapacity,whichalsodiscouragesnon-OPECinvestmenent.Second,OPECcangeneratelargermovesinpriceswithagivenadjustmentinproductionwheninventoriesarelow.
Third,whileOPECistoolargetosellitsproductionforwardandisthusexposedtospotprices,shaleproducersoftensellatforwardpricesthroughhedging.16November202312GoldmanSachsOilAnalystStress
Testing
the
80-100
RangeWe
nextstresstestourviewthatoilpriceswillbeina80-100
rangein2024.
Weestimatetheeffect
ofthreekey
risksonour2024Q4Brentforecastof$94/bblusingourpricing
framework.BasedonourassessmentofthelikelyOPECresponse,we
concludethatBrentislikelytoremaininorclosetoour80-100
rangeinmostriskscenariosunlessOPECbecamesigni?cantlylessassertive(downsidepricerisk),orifOPECispreventedfromdeployingitssparecapacity(tailupsidepricerisk).nnnModerate
recession
(-$17/bbl
under
OPEC
response):ThisscenarioassumesamoderateOECDrecessionstartingin2024Q1,lasting4quarters,withspilloverstonon-OECDeconomies.5
Inthisscenario,we
thinkthatkey
OPEC+countries—SaudiArabia,Russia,UAE,Kuwait,
andIraq—wouldlikelynotgraduallyraiseproduction(asourbaselineassumes).Ifoutputfromthese5countriesstays?at
atits2023Q4level,thenBrentwouldbe$17
lower
thaninourbaseline,andreach
$77/bblin2024Q4.IfOPEC+outputweretoriseinlinewithourbaselinesupplyoutlookdespitearecession,then2024Q4Brentwouldbe$31lower
at$62/bbl.Non
OPEC
supply
beats
again
(-$12/bbl
under
OPEC
response):ThisscenarioassumesthatglobalsupplyexcludingcoreOPEC,Iraq,andRussia,Iranbeatsourexpectationsin2024by
thesamemagnitudeasin2023.Inthisscenario,extensionsoftheextraSaudicutthrough2024andthegroupcutannouncedin
April2023through2025Q1appearlikely.
Onnet,we
estimatethatBrentwouldthenbe$12lower
thaninourbaseline,andreach
$82/bblin2024Q4.IfOPEC+outputweretoriseinlinewithourbaselinesupplyoutlook,we
estimatethat2024Q4Brentwouldbe$19
lower
at$74/bbl.Supply
disruptions
(+$5/bbl
under
OPEC
response):Thisscenarioassumesa0.5mb/driseinunplannedproductiondisruptionstothe2011-2023
averageof1.8mb/d
startingin2024Q1.6
Inthisscenario,we
thinkthatSaudi
Arabiamay
startunwindingitsextracutin2024Q2(vs.our2024Q3baseline).Onnet,we
estimatethatBrentwouldbe$5higherthaninourbaseline,andreach
$99/bblin2024Q4.Combiningthesedisruptionsandourbaselinesupplypathwouldimply$8/bblofupsidewith2024Q4Brentat$102/bbl.5Itassumesapeak4%hittothelevelofOECDGDP(relativetotheGSbaseline),whichisslightlymoremoderatethanthemedianhistoricalrecessioninG10
economies,andapeak2%hittonon-OECDGDP.We
useEIAestimatesofglobalunplanneddisruptionproductionsexcludingIran,Russia,Norway,NorthSea,andtheUK.
TheEIAestimatesthelargest2023Q3disruptionsforIraq,Nigeria,andLibya.616November202313GoldmanSachsOilAnalystExhibit
14:
The
OPEC
Response
Is
Likely
to
Keep
Prices
in
a
80-100
Range$/bbl$/bbl1202024Q4BrentPrices120OPECResponseNo
OPECResponseGS
Likely
RangeFutures100806040200100806040200Moderate
RecessionNon-OPEC
Supply
BeatsSupplyDisruptionsSource:ICE,HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearchWhilewe
seeaseveresupplydownsideriskscenario,such
asapotentialinterruptionoftradethroughtheStraitofHormuz,ashighlyunlikely,
theresultingrallywouldlikelybesizable.Speci?cally,we
estimatethatoilpricesinthistailscenariowherecoreOPECcannotdeployitssparecapacityinitiallyrise20%above
ourbaselineinthe?rstmonthofinterruption,andmay
temporarilydoubleinthemuch
lesslikelyscenarioofanextendeddisruption.16November202314GoldmanSachsOilAnalystRe?ning’s
Catch-22Whilethereisamplesparecapacityinupstreamcrudeoilproduction,thedownstreamre?ningsystemremainsthetightest
sector
of
the
oil
industry,
implyingpersistentlyelevatedre?nedproductmarginsandtimespreads.Structural
TightnessWe
estimatethatthecurrentglobalre?ningutilizationrateof85%sitsinpercentile
90of
its
historical
distribution(Exhibit
15),and3-4p.p.above
themid-cyclenorms.Exhibit
15:
The
Re?ning
System
Is
Structurally
TightSource:IEA,BP,
IIR,OGJ,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearchThisstructuraltightnessre?ectsfourkey
factors.First,7mb/dofdisruptions
and
pandemic-related
closures
sincethelate2010s
havedepressedre?ningcapacity.Second,demandfor
re?nedproductshasreached
an
alltime
high.
Third,morefrequentweather-related
disruptions,andthedivergencebetweenthequalityofcrudesupplyandthetypeofre?nedproductsindemandarestraining
the
system
inunusualways.Fourth,thecombinationofelevatedlong-run
demand
uncertaintyandtheverylongcycleofre?ninginvestmentshaslimitedinvestmentinnew
re?neries.Infact,weestimatethatthemedianDMre?neryisnow
50yearsold,withpayback
periodsofmorethantwodecades.
Whilehighpricesusuallytendtocurehighprices,thedurationmismatchbetweeninvestmentandreturnsprecludessuch
anaturalrebalancing.Thisdynamic–re?ning’sCatch-22—willlikelycementare?ningbullmarketuntilEV-penetrationscalessigni?cantly.Againstthisstructurallytightre?ningbackdrop,we
expectonlymodestincrementaleasingover
2024-2025.
Although1.8/1.4mb/d
ofnetcapacityadditions(revised+0.1/+0.1)stilloutweighthe1.4/0.9mb/d
growthexpectedinre?nedproductdemand(+0.1/+0.4)over
thisperiod,we
now
lookfor
lessincrementaleasingthanpreviously.Andeven
underourforecastofan84.6%utilizationratein2025,thesystemremains16November202315GoldmanSachsOilAnalystvulnerabletofurtherdelaysincapacityadditionsthatremainconcentratedinEMswithahistory
of
delays
and
operational
challenges.The
combinationofre?ningtightnessandthedistortionofdemandacrossproductsimpliesongoing
divergence
in
re?nery
margins.
We
expectcomplexre?nerstoberewardedfor
productionofpremiumproductsinhighdemand(gasoline,diesel),whilesimplere?nersearnlower
marginsonproducingsurplusnaphtha(apetrochemicalfeedstock)andfueloilinlow
demand.
We
thereforethinkthattoday’s
low
complexre?ningmargins(belowthe2015-19
average)inmultipleregionsarenotsustainableandwillpick
up.Exhibit
16:
WeExpect
a
Return
to
a
Divergent
Margin
Environment
that
Rewards
Complex
Re?nersSimpleSingaporeandcomplexUSGulfCoastre?ningmarginsadjustedforslate,yield,freight,processingcosts(USD/bbl).Dashedlinesare2015-19average35302520151050-5-10Simple
SingaporerefiningmarginsComplexUSGCrefining
marginsSource:ICE,CME,DME,Platts,Re?nitivEikon,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearchHigher
Summer
Gasoline
Re?nery
MarginsWe
areconstructive
on
gasoline
re?nery
margins,andneutralondieselmargins.Globalgasolinere?nerymarginshave
bouncedinrecentweeksfromcostsupport,assistedby
yield-switchingtodiesel,aswe
hadexpected.
Arecoveryincurrentlydepressed
gasoline
positioning
islikelytofurtherboostgasolinere?nerymargins.We
maintainourcal24/25gasoline-Brentcrack
forecastsat$13/10
(NWEuropeanEBOB)and$18/16/bbl(USRBOB),respectively,asthebearishincorporationofthelighterslate(increasinggasolinesupply)offsetsbullishinventorydeclines.Ourgasolinere?nerymarginsforecastsremainwellabove
the2019
averagesof$7/8/bbl,respectively.
We
thuscontinuetorecommendlongpositionsinsummergasolinemargins,whenwe
expectoctaneconstraintstoonceagaindictatesigni?cantpriceupside.
We
prefertoexpresslengthinEuropeanproductcracks,givenourcontinu
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