披露的相互作用會計(jì)政策選擇和自愿披露信息對籌集外部資本成本的影響

Disclosureinteractions:accountingpolicychoiceandvoluntarydisclosureeffectsonthecostofraisingoutsidecapital披露的相互作用:會計(jì)政策選擇和自愿披露信息對籌集外部資本成本的影響Abstract—Inthisresearchweconsiderhowdisclosureofaccountingpolicyinteractswithsubsequentchoiceovervoluntarydisclosureofanon-financialperformancemetric.摘要：此項(xiàng)研究的內(nèi)容為會計(jì)政策披露如何與后續(xù)的選擇非財(cái)務(wù)業(yè)績指標(biāo)自愿性披露相互作用。Wecompareandcontrastregimes.Inthefirst,firmsarefreetochoosebetweenaconservativeoranaggressiveaccountingpolicybeforetheydecidewhethertomakeadditionalvoluntarydisclosures.Intheotherregime,allfirmseithervoluntarilyorviamandationusethesameaccountingpolicy.Wetheninvestigatethecostofraisingcapitalforfirmsunderthetworegimes.Weshowthatcommunicationviavoluntarydisclosureneednotbeasimplesubstituteforcommunicationviaaccountingpolicychoice.我們將管理制度進(jìn)行比較和對比。首先，企業(yè)在決定是否追加自愿性披露之前，可以自由選擇保守或激進(jìn)的會計(jì)政策。在其他制度中，所有企業(yè)自愿或通過強(qiáng)制使用相同的會計(jì)政策。調(diào)查顯示通過自愿披露的信息交流不能簡單地取代通過會計(jì)政策選擇的信息交流。Introduction引言'Increasingly,moresophisticatedcompanieshaverecognisedtheshortcomingsofthehistoricfinancialreportingmodelasaneffectivecommunicationstool,andareseekingwaystomeasureandreportonnewerandmoreprogressivedriversofvalue.'PricewaterhouseCoopers,1999:11)“越來越多富有經(jīng)驗(yàn)的公司已經(jīng)意識到古老的財(cái)務(wù)申報(bào)模式作為一種有效的溝通工具所存在的弊端，并正在尋求方法來衡量和上報(bào)更新及更先進(jìn)的價(jià)值創(chuàng)造的驅(qū)動力?！薄云杖A永道會計(jì)師事務(wù)所，1999:11）Inafinancialworldinwhichtimelycorporatecommunicationistakingplaceviaahostofchannelssuchasanalystmeetings,pressandinternetreports,theabovequotationsuggeststhattraditionalhistoricfinancialreportsareofincreasinglymarginalvalue.Indeed,inthelimit,onemaytaketheextremepositionthathistoricfinancialreportsaresimplyalegalrequirementaftertheeventandthattheprimarytimelymeansbywhichinvestorperceptionscanbeinfluencedisviaongoingvoluntarydisclosuresoffinancialandnon-financialperformancemetrics.Ourresearcharguesthatsuchaviewomitsatleastoneveryimportantfeatureofcorporatecommunication.Weshow,inastylisedsetting,thatinequilibriumthechoiceoftheauthorsare,respectively,attheFacultyofFinance.CassBusinessSchoolandDept.Economi'adelaEmpresa,UniversidadCarlosIIIdeMadrid.在金融界，可以通過眾多的渠道展開適時(shí)的公司信息交流，如分析師會議、新聞和互聯(lián)網(wǎng)報(bào)道等，上述引文表明了傳統(tǒng)古老的財(cái)務(wù)申報(bào)的價(jià)值日益減少。的確，在極限上，在發(fā)生大事件后，財(cái)務(wù)申報(bào)只僅僅當(dāng)作是一種法律要件，且主要的及時(shí)的手段是通過正在進(jìn)行的財(cái)政的和非財(cái)政性能標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的自愿性披露來影響于投資者。我們的研究證明了如此的一種觀點(diǎn)忽略了至少一個(gè)非常主要的關(guān)于公司信息交流的特征。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，在一個(gè)程序化的環(huán)境中，在均衡狀態(tài)下，作者的選擇分別是在卡斯商學(xué)院金融系和馬德里卡洛斯三世大學(xué)Economi'adelaEmpresa部。TheygratefullyacknowledgethecommentsofseminarparticipantsattheEIASMIVAccountingandEconomicsWorkshopCopenhagen,CarlosIIIUniversity,GSBUniversityofChicago,WhartonSchoolandStanBaiman,DanBens,SudiptoBhattacharya,AlfredWagenhoferandtwoanonymousreferees.CorrespondenceshouldbeaddressedtoProfessorGietzmann,ProfessorofCorporateDisclosure,SirJohnCassBusinessSchool.106BunhillRow,LondonECIY8TZ.Tel:+44(0)2070400286;E-mail;m.b.gietzmann@city.ac.uk他們非常感謝EIASMIV會計(jì)和經(jīng)濟(jì)研討會哥本哈根，卡洛斯三世大學(xué)，芝加哥大學(xué)商學(xué)院，沃頓商學(xué)院和StanBaiman，DanBens，SudiptoBhattacharya，AlfredWagenhofer和兩個(gè)匿名裁判研討會的與會者的意見。信函應(yīng)致倫敦ECIY8TZ登喜路街106號約翰?卡斯爵士商學(xué)院上市公司信息披露教授Gietzmann。聯(lián)系電話：+44(0)2070400286;E-mail;m.b.gietzmann@city.ac.uk。ThefinalversionofthispaperwasacceptedinFebruary2003.historicaccountingpolicycanbeusedtocommunicateprivateinformationaboutthefirmbecausethechoiceinteractswiththeoptimalfirmstrategyforvoluntarydisclosure.Toillustratetheimportanceofsuchinteractiveeffects,weareabletoshowformallythattheoptimaldisclosurepolicyforsomefirmsissimplytodisclosechoiceofaconservativeaccountingpolicy.此篇論文的最終版本是在2003年2月份的歷史性會計(jì)政策中通過，因?yàn)檫x擇性與自愿性披露的最佳戰(zhàn)略的相互作用，因此可以用于交流關(guān)于公司的保密信息。為了顯示此相互影響的重要性，我們可以從形式上顯示某些公司的最佳披露政策是簡單地披露保守會計(jì)政策的選擇。Incontrast,othertypesoffirmsfindittoocostlytoadoptconservativeaccountingandinsteadcommunicateviavoluntarydisclosure.Thus,whenafirm'scost'ofraisingoutsidecapitalisdependentupontheextentofinformationthatpotentialinvestorsreceive,thenceterisparibus,ifthefirmincreases(credible)voluntarydisclosuresthiswillputdownwardpressureuponthecostofraisingcapital.Thishasledtoanumberofempiricalstudiestestingthelinkbetweenvoluntarydisclosureandthecostsofraisingcapital.Withsuchstudiesinmind,itisimportanttonotethattheabovepotentialbenefitofmakingvoluntarydisclosuresdoesnotnecessarilyimplythatinvestorswillrewardfirmsthatmakethemostvoluntarydisclosureswiththelowestcostsforraisingcapital.Thismayariseempiricallybecausetheceterisparibusconditionthatweassumedabovedoesnothold.Thatis,firmsmaysimultaneouslychoosetocommunicateinotherways.Specifically,giveninteractionbetweenthetwocommunicationchannels,accountingpolicychoiceandvoluntarydisclosures,onecannotconcludethatfirmswhichmakemorevoluntarydisclosureswillfacealowercost.Wewillmakeprecisewhatthiscostisshortly.相反，其他類型的公司發(fā)現(xiàn)采取保守的會計(jì)政策代價(jià)太高，而選擇通過自愿性披露來進(jìn)行信息交流。因此，一個(gè)企業(yè)的籌集外資的成本是決定于潛在投資者獲得信息的多少，然后其他條件不變，如果企業(yè)增加（可靠的）自愿性披露，這樣就會將下行壓力增加到籌資的成本上。如此已經(jīng)引起了大量的測試自愿性披露和籌資成本之間聯(lián)系的實(shí)證研究。關(guān)于此些研究，需注意的是上述關(guān)于采取自愿性披露的潛在利益不一定意味著投資者會獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)那些大部分采取集資低成本的自愿性披露的企業(yè)。從經(jīng)驗(yàn)上出發(fā)，產(chǎn)生這種現(xiàn)象是因?yàn)槲覀兩厦婕僭O(shè)其他條件不變的條件不成立。換言之，企業(yè)也許會同時(shí)選擇通過其他方式來交流信息。特別是考慮到會計(jì)政策選擇和自愿性披露這兩種交流渠道之間的相互作用，無法判定選擇自愿性披露的企業(yè)會面臨更低的成本。我們可以很快地算出精確的成本。Forthemomentthiscostcanbeinterpretedasbeingdependentupontheextenttowhichinvestorshavecredibleinformationconcerningtheprospectsofthefirm.Thelessinformationprovidedtopotentialinvestors,thehigherthecostofraisingoutsidecapitalthanfirmsthatdiscloseless.Indeed,weshowinourpaperhowanequilibriumcanexistinwhichthefirmsthatmaketheleastvoluntarydisclosuresfacethelowestcostofraisingcapital.Thisarisesbecauseinsomewelldefinedsettings,potentialinvestorsrationallyformanexpectationthatthosefirmsthatchooseaconservativeaccountingpolicyandsimultaneouslydecidenotmakevoluntarydisclosuresaremorelikelytobesuccessful,thanfirmswhichadoptanaggressiveaccountingpolicyandsimultaneouslymakevoluntarydisclosures.Thus,themainthemeofthispaperwillbetomodeltheinteractionsbetweenthetwocommunicationchannelsandhowthesegiverisetofirmsadoptingdifferentcommunicationstrategies.目前此項(xiàng)成本可以認(rèn)為是依賴于投資者獲得關(guān)于企業(yè)前景的可靠性信息的多少。提供給潛在投資者的信息越少，相當(dāng)于那些披露信息少的企業(yè)的籌集外資的成本就越高。的確，在本文中已表明集資成本的平衡狀態(tài)是如何存在于那些采取最少的自愿性披露來面對最低的集資成本的企業(yè)中。出現(xiàn)這種情況，是因?yàn)樵谝恍┝己枚x的設(shè)置，潛在投資者都理性地形成一種期望，即那些選擇了一種保守的會計(jì)政策，并同時(shí)決定不采取自愿披露的企業(yè)，相對于那些采取激進(jìn)的會計(jì)政策，并同時(shí)作出自愿披露的公司來說，成功的可能性會更大。因此，本文的主題將塑造此兩種信息交流渠道之間的相互作用和導(dǎo)致企業(yè)采用不同信息交流戰(zhàn)略的原因。Tounderstandintuitivelytherichnessoftheempiricalsettingwemodel,wenotethatgiventwocommunicationchannels,one'sfirstimpressionmaybetobelievethatifonechannelisrestricted(forinstancebyvoluntarychoiceorviamandationofaccountingpolicy),theoptimalresponsemaybesimplytoincreasecommunicationviatheotherchannel(voluntarydisclosure).Forthosewhotaketheviewthatmorevoluntarydisclosureshouldbepromoted,sucharesult(ifitweretrue)wouldbedesirable.Expressedinformally,theabovelogiccouldbeusedtosupp