不完全合同框架下公有產(chǎn)權(quán)改革研究述評(píng)_圖文

1、 不完全合同框架下公有產(chǎn)權(quán)改革研究述評(píng) 作者： 作者單位： 刊名： 英文刊名： 年，卷(期： 被引用次數(shù)： 謝貞發(fā)， Xie Zhen-fa 廈門(mén)大學(xué),財(cái)政系,福建,廈門(mén),361005 當(dāng)代財(cái)經(jīng) CONTEMPORARY FINANCE & ECONOMICS 2005，(4 1次 參考文獻(xiàn)(27條 1.Hart Oliver Incomplete contracts and public ownership: remarks, and an application to public -private partnerships 2003 2.Ma skin Eric.Tirole,Jean

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4、990(06 11.Hart Oliver.Shleifer, Andrei.Vishny, Robert W The proper scope of government: theory and an application to prisons 1997 12.Besley Timothy.Ghatak, Maitreesh Government versus private ownership of public goods 2001 13.Shirley Mary M.Walsh Patrick Public versus private ownership: the current

5、state of the debate 2000 14.Sappington David E M.Stiglitz Joseph E Privatization,information and incentives 1987 15.Shapiro Carl.Willig Robert D Economic rationales for privatization in industrial and developing countries 1990 16.Shleifer Andrei.Robert,Vishny Politicians and Firms 1994(04 17.Boycko

6、Maxim.Shleifer, Andrei.Vishny, Robert A Theory of Privatization 1996(106 18.傅紹文.鄧秋云 剩余控制權(quán)理論綜述期刊論文-經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)動(dòng)態(tài) 2004(11 19.Chiu Y Stephen 查看詳情 1998(04 20.DeMeza David.Lockwood, Ben Does asset ownership always motivate managers? Outside options and the property rights theory of the firm 1998 21.Rajan Raghura

7、m G.Zingales, Luigi Power in a theory of the firm 1998 22.查看詳情 23.查看詳情 24.當(dāng)然,在私人企業(yè)中,所有者與管理者的目標(biāo)是不可能完全一致的,但是,相對(duì)于政府來(lái)說(shuō),他們間的目標(biāo)是較為一致的 25.雖然Laffont andTirole指出,如果同時(shí)考慮民營(yíng)化的投資激勵(lì)雙重邊際化效應(yīng)與更多的不可合約化投資,那么公共企業(yè)和私人企業(yè) 的相對(duì)成本效率比較是模糊不清的,從而僅僅理論本身在這方面是不可能有定論的.但是,民營(yíng)化后的總體效果(更低的配置效率和更高 的生產(chǎn)效率是確定的 26.除本文提到的基本結(jié)論外,BG模型還研究了一些相關(guān)情形:共同所有權(quán)、政府與營(yíng)利性企業(yè)的合作、投資產(chǎn)出中存在部分私人產(chǎn)品、 兩種投資是完全替代的關(guān)系、雙方偏好間存在某種負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系等 27.一些學(xué)者對(duì)GHM模型的有限性進(jìn)行了檢驗(yàn).Chiu19、DeMeza and Lockwood20、Rajanand Zingales21就曾指出,GHM模型結(jié)論的 成立依賴于對(duì)重新談判博弈的假定,當(dāng)假定變化時(shí),結(jié)論可能是相反的