歐盟經(jīng)濟(jì)社會與政策講義-倫敦經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院

1、by Andrs Rodrguez-Pose London School of Economics Oxford University Press ISBN 0-19-874286-X,THE EUROPEAN UNION: ECONOMY, SOCIETY, AND POLITY,Part I,ECONOMY,Chapter 1,Competitiveness,The stages of economic integration,Free trade areas: Free trade between members, different external tariffs Little or

2、 no institutional co-ordination Customs union: Free trade between members and common external trade restriction Common regulatory bodies Common (or single) markets: Removal of all barriers to free factor mobility Free mobility of goods, capital, labour, and services Greater level of regulation and s

3、trong institutions to monitor decisions adopted by member states,The stages of economic integration (II),Economic union: Harmonisation of economic policies (generally monetary or fiscal policy) Members give up powers. Strong central institutions which dictate common economic policy Complete economic

4、 integration: All economic policy areas are harmonised The capacity of states to implement independent policies disappears Central institutions become the centres of economic decision-making,The stages of economic integration in the EU,Economic integration to achieve competitiveness,Why did a custom

5、s union (the EC) decide to increase the pace of economic integration during the 1980s and 1990s? Increasing globalisation of the world economy (increased competition, especially from the US, Japan, and the NICs) More sophisticated systems to dodge trade barriers (multinational corporations) Belief t

6、hat market fragmentation (nationally divided markets) was reducing economies of scale,GDP per capita (2000) in Europe, the US and Japan,The limits of European competitiveness,The costs of the non-Europe (Cecchini, 1991): Physical barriers: Intra-European stoppages, controls at border checkpoints, re

7、d-tape, different currencies Technical barriers: Different national product standards and technical regulations across Member States Fiscal barriers: Lack of fiscal harmonisation,Physical barriers,Custom related costs: Customs controls, border stoppages Paperwork and red-tape Exchange of low-value a

8、dded perishable goods suffered as a result High administrative costs and regulatory hassles: Higher cost of red-tape of SMEs (higher proportion of their business volume, and lack of expertise and human resources),Physical barriers (II),Protected markets (II): Fear of foreign dependence leads to prot

9、ection of national strategic sectors Many sectors fall under this umbrella: petrochemical industries, shipbuilding, iron and steel, tobacco, car manufacturing, telecommunications, air transport,. Formation of monopolies (BT, Deutsche Telekom, SIP, Air France, Iberia,.) or oligopolies Cost of protect

10、ion born by the consumer: Lack of competition and underperforming industries And companies: Higher prices for services than their competitors,Physical barriers (III),Different currencies: Transaction costs of changing currencies Higher costs of holding higher international reserves Costs associated

11、to exchange rate volatility Higher interest rates in many countries,Technical barriers,Different product standards and technical regulations: Problems and additional costs for consumers Cost for firms which had to adapt their products to different national standards Cost premium for SMEs Protected p

12、ublic-sector procurement: Government supply and construction contrast restricted to national firms Or technical regulations discriminating against foreign bidders,Fiscal barriers,Different fiscal regimes: Different regimes for companies Different VAT rates Different national accounting standards: Du

13、plication or multiplication of accounting standards for multinational companies Fiscal suspicion by national authorities in order to prevent tax evasion Premium for SMEs,The expected benefits of economic integration,Cecchini report (1988). Cost saving effects: Static trade effect: benefits reaped fr

14、om allowing public authorities to buy from the cheapest suppliers Competition effect: Downward pressure on prices as a result of greater competition Restructuring effect: Reorganisation of industrial sectors and individual companies as a result of greater competition Other possible benefits: Benefit

15、s on investment, innovation (rationalisation of R 0.38 of EU GDP Has this effort paid off? Have the reform of the Structural Funds and the introduction of a Cohesion Fund led to greater territorial cohesion?,The efficiency of EU development policies,Before the Reform, little or no catch-up in the co

16、hesion countries No convergence in Greece or Spain Slow convergence in Ireland and Portugal Since the Reform, the four Cohesion countries have converged to the EU average Greatest convergence in Ireland Lowest convergence in Spain Convergence has also been fuelled by slow economic growth in the core

17、 Especially in Finland, Germany, Italy, and Sweden,Evolution of GDP per capita in the Cohesion countries,The efficiency of EU development policies (II),The catch-up since the Reform of the Structural Funds has led some authors to claim that regional intervention in the EU has been a success The pict

18、ure is, however, not as simple A closer look at development within the Cohesion countries reveals a more complex pattern The higher growth has taken place in some of the most advanced regions (Madrid, Catalonia, Dublin, Lisbon) Large concentration of company headquarters, R Hoem) Others suggest that

19、 family policies have had an impact The actual evidence is inconclusive Lack of adequate family policies may have contributed to the decline in fertility in southern Europe Some countries with more generous family policies (Sweden, Finland, Denmark, France, the UK) tend to have slightly higher ferti

20、lity rates But countries with similar family policy regimes differ in their fertility rates,Social policies for old age,The process of ageing is putting European social services under considerable stress: Social policies for old age have become one of the most important areas of public policy Old ag

21、e expenditure (as a % of GDP) has risen significantly since the 1980s and remained stable during much of the 1990s Old age expenditure represents two fifths of all social expenditure (highest incidence in Italy, Greece, and Spain),Old age expenditure in the EU,Conclusion,Ageing poses a serious chall

22、enge for the future of European societies: Society may become more conservative and risk-averse, less open to innovation and foreign influences, and less dynamic and able to compete Ageing represents a challenge for public finances More and better targeted policies may be needed Even if the percepti

23、on of an aged society as a less dynamic society may be rather reductionist.,Chapter 4,Migration and xenophobia,Introduction,While Europe ages, neighbouring countries have young and dynamic populations who find few outlets in their local labour markets: Result: development of large migration flows to

24、wards Europe Many see this trend as a solution for population ageing and to ease social and economic pressure in the country of origin of migrants Many others see migration as a threat, leading to xenophobia and the emergence of racist attitudes and parties European legislation has been tightened in

25、 order to restrict migration into Europe,Migration and its forms (I),Definition of migration: The movement or displacement of a person or a number of persons from one place to another. Forms of migration: Individual or group migration Regional, inter-regional, international or intercontinental Tempo

26、rary or permanent Legal and illegal,Migration and its forms (II),Forms of migration (II): Economic migration: when people move in search of jobs and/or a better life Types of economic migration: Migrant or employer-initiated Economic migration is closely linked to long-term economic cycles Non-econo

27、mic migration: Causes Natural disaster (the destruction of the island of Montserrat by a volcanic eruption, floods, earthquakes, droughts) War Political and/or social persecution (political and religious beliefs, race, ethnicity, gender) Division between political refugees and asylum seekers,Mass mi

28、gration in post-war Europe (I),In modern times migration out of Europe has predominated: America, Australia and South Africa as the main destinations At the beginning of the 20th century more than a million Europeans a year were leaving the Continent The second half of the 20th century has seen a re

29、versal of this trend Outward migration has been replaced by migration within and into Western Europe First, 25 million refugees back to their places of origin (mainly flow east-west, including 12 million Germans) Then migration from former Communist regimes to the West (3.8 million East Germans unti

30、l the erection of the Berlin Wall),Mass migration in post-war Europe (II),Since the 1950s emergence of South/North economic migration Basically in low-skilled and poorly paid sectors (rejected by the local workforce) Several waves and destination: 1950s: Italians moving to Germany, Switzerland, and

31、France Late 1950s and 1960s: Spaniards and Portuguese (same destinations) 1960s: Turks and Yugoslavs (to Germany) and workers from the Maghreb (to France) Irish to Britain and Finns to Sweden Migration very often employer-initiated and state-managed Large volumes of migration: Migrants represented 5

32、% of the pop. of the Netherlands; 5 to 10% of France, Germany and Sweden; 10% of Belgium; 15% of Switzerland and 25% of Luxembourg.,Mass migration in post-war Europe (III),Jobs for migrants varied: West Germany: Jobs in manufacturing (15% in construction) France: 30% in construction. Smaller proport

33、ion as health workers and manufacturing UK: West Indians as civil servants, South Asians in textiles As did the formal rights of immigrants: Germany, Austria and Switzerland: Gastarbeiters (high levels of job security but low protection without job contract) UK, France and the Netherlands: Rights of

34、 immigrants to stay, generally more developed (possibility to apply for citizenship after a period living in the country) The crisis of the 1970s brought South/North migration in Europe almost to a halt Stock of migrants fell by 1 million (or 22% of stock) Return migration by European workers Return

35、 migration less evident for non-EU citizens,The renewal of migration in the 1990s,Several factors have led to a renewal of migration in the 1990s: Economic and social factors: The economic bonanza of the second half of the 1990s The reduction of unemployment rates associated to the introduction a la

36、bour market flexibility The higher level of qualification of local workers The demographic boom in neighbouring areas of the world Political factors: The fall of the Berlin Wall The implementation of the principle of free movement of people after the Single Market.,Foreign or foreign-born population

37、,Differences between migration in the 1950s and 1990s (I),The traditional North/South division has been completely slashed: Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain are no longer sources of emigrants, but have positive migration balances (in the case of Italy since as early as 1972) Intra

38、-EU migration is no longer South/North but occurs in both directions (case of Ireland, Sun-belt phenomena) The Mediterranean sea (and the former Iron Curtain) are becoming the new Rio Grande of Europe,Differences between migration in the 1950s and 1990s (II),Employer initiated migration has almost b

39、ecome a thing of the past: In contrast to more common practices in the US, Canada, or Australia. European employers and governments are more reluctant to initiate migration. Some exceptions: Attempt by the German government in 2000 to recruit IT experts in India Migration has become almost exclusive

40、ly migrant-initiated,Differences between migration in the 1950s and 1990s (III),Increase of clandestine and illegal immigration As a result of the tightening of national and European immigration legislation More migrants decide to come and stay in Europe illegally: Flourishing of mafias, racketeers

41、and organised crime syndicates trying to smuggle immigrants into Europe Diversification of immigrant groups Highly qualified migrants Low-skilled economic migrants and clandestines Refugees and asylum seekers,Migration of the highly qualified (I),Migration of the highly qualified has flourished duri

42、ng the 1990s: Basically in sectors such as finance, banks, insurance, and business services But increasingly also in fashion, design and R a functioning market economy, capable of coping with an increasingly competitive market pressure an institutional framework capable of assuming the obligations o

43、f the acquis communautaire in its entirety. Enlargement, however, played second fiddle to economic and political integration until the implementation of the single currency It is only since the arrival of the Euro that enlargement has become the EUs greatest priority,Enlargement for candidate countr

44、ies,For candidate countries the EU is regarded as guaranteeing: Democratic stability Economic prosperity But it also implies: Swallowing the bitter pill of thorough economic, institutional, and political reform Economic reform may have important implications for economies that are, as a general rule

45、, much poorer that previous candidates Greater need for adjustment than in previous enlargements as a result of the growth of the acquis communautaire in recent years,Enlargement for the EU,Enlargement will increase the heterogeneity of the EU and therefore requires a rethinking of European institut

46、ions and policies The Treaty of Rome was originally devised for six member states, enlargement to twenty five or more members implies a thorough revision of the Treaty And a thorough revision of the current institutional framework And of the decision-making rules Enlargement has also important budge

47、tary implications Thorough revision of main EU policies (agricultural, structural, and cohesion) Enlargement may revive the large flows of east-west migration of the early 1990s,Conclusion,Enlargement will transform the EU It will increase political and economic stability across Europe It will incre

48、ase the budgetary burden on the EU if no thorough reform of current policies is undertaken It may lead to institutional paralysis without thorough reform It will tilt the balance of power in the EU, probably in Germanys favour A successful enlargement requires a thorough reform of: The economies, po

49、licies, and institutions of applicant countries A thorough institutional and policy reform in the EU itself,Chapter 7,Regionalism and regionalization,Introduction,An important challenge to the European nation-state is emerging from below Recently most European countries have witnessed a revival of r

50、egionalism This revival has triggered processes of regionalization and devolution Centralized states are increasingly becoming the exception to the rule (a Europe of the Regions) Main questions: How and why did the process of regionalization come about? Are we really witnessing the emergence of a Eu

51、rope of the Regions?,Regional devolution in Europe,At the end of the 1960s The great majority of the states in Europe were centralized states Powerful central administrations Solid and generally small local authorities Regions as mere administrative divisions Austria, Germany, and Switzerland (with

52、Yugoslavia on the other side of the Iron Curtain) as the main exceptions to the rule At the beginning of the 21st century Strong central governments are on the retreat Centralized governments are increasingly confined to relatively small and homogenous states,Regional devolution in Europe (II),Chall

53、enges to the centralized state have been widespread in larger and less homogenous states Partition of former plurinational states: Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Soviet Union Devolution as a general process in the EU Federal states: power of the central state confined to foreign policy, defence and som

54、e macro-economic management (A, B, D) Regional states: Substantial autonomy achieved without a profound restructuring of the state (E, I) Regionalized states: less advanced form of decentralization (F, P, UK) Unitary states: little or no decentralization (Dk, SF, Gr, Irl, L, Nl, S),Regional devoluti

55、on in Europe (III),There are also differences in the levels of regional autonomy within states Homogenous level of devolution only in federal states and France Asymmetrical devolution in Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the UK Historical regions or regions with greater identity enjoy higher levels of aut

56、onomy (Italy and Spain) Parts of the country have devolved powers, while others remain under central rule (Portugal and the UK),Level of regional autonomy across the EU,From regionalism to regionalization,Two waves of regionalism and regionalization (Keating 1998) 1960s and 1970s: Deeply rooted in i

57、dentity issues Late 1980s and 1990s: the new regionalism More widespread than in the previous wave More often based on economic rather than on identity grounds Austria and Germany Federal states since the second WW Federal structure as a way to weaken the power of the central state and to prevent th

58、e re-emergence of German militarism,From regionalism to regionalization (II),Belgium The country that has undergone the deepest transformation: From unitary to regionalized in 1970 and to federal in 1993 Regional division based on the deep linguistic and cultural cleavages that divide the state Regi

59、onal division of power follows two criteria: Language: Three communities (Flemish-speaking, French-speaking and German-speaking communities) Identity: Three regions (Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels) The Flemish Community and Region have merged into one entity Result: a complex territorial structure with five territorially overlapping subnational entities,From regionalism to regionalization (III),Spain A failed secular nation-building process and repression of regional identities by the Francoist regime fuelled resentment in the peripheral nations of Spain With the restoration of demo