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1、文獻(xiàn)信息:文獻(xiàn)標(biāo)題:Evaluating credit risk and loan performance in onlinePeer-to-Peer (P2P) lending (點(diǎn)對(duì)點(diǎn)(P2P)網(wǎng)絡(luò)借貸的信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)與貸款績(jī)效評(píng) 估)國(guó)外作者: Riza Emekter, Yanbin Tu, Benjamas Jirasakuldech, Min Lu 文獻(xiàn)出處:Applied Economics,2015, 47(1):54-70字?jǐn)?shù)統(tǒng)計(jì):英文3063單詞,15818字符;中文5110漢字外文文獻(xiàn):Evaluating credit risk and loan performance in
2、 onlinePeer-to-Peer (P2P) lendingAbstract Online Peer-to-Peer (P2P) lending has emerged recently. This micro loan market could offer certain benefits to both borrowers and lenders. Using data from the Lending Club, which is one of the popular online P2P lending houses, this article explores the P2P
3、loan characteristics, evaluates their credit risk and measures loan performances. We find that credit grade, debt-to-income ratio, FICO score and revolving line utilization play an important role in loan defaults. Loans with lower credit grade and longer duration are associated with high mortality r
4、ate. The result is consistent with the Cox Proportional Hazard test which suggests that the hazard rate or the likelihood of the loan default increases with the credit risk of the borrowers. Finally, we find that higher interest rates charged on the highrisk borrowers are not enough to compensate fo
5、r higher probability of the loan default. The Lending Club must find ways to attract high FICO score and high-income borrowers in order to sustain their businesses.Key words: Peer-to-Peer lending; credit grade; FICO score; default riskI.IntroductionWith the advent of Web 2.0, it has become easy to c
6、reate online markets and virtual communities with convenient accessibility and strong collaboration.One of the emerging Web 2.0 applications is the online Peer-to-Peer (P2P) lending marketplaces, where both lenders and borrowers can virtually meet for loan transactions. Such marketplaces provide a p
7、latform service of introducing borrowers to lenders, which can offer some advantages for both borrowers and lenders. Borrowers can get micro loans directly from lenders, and might pay lower rates than commercial credit alternatives. On the other hand, lenders can earn higher rates of return compared
8、 to any other type of lending such as corporate bonds, bank deposits or certificate of deposits. One of the problems in online P2P lending is information asymmetry between the borrower and the lender. That is, the lender does not know the borrowers credibility as well as the borrower does. Such info
9、rmation asymmetry might result in adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970) and moral hazard (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Theoretically, some of these problems can be alleviated by regular monitoring, but this approach poses a challenge in the online environment because the borrowers and the buyers do not ph
10、ysically meet. Fostering and enhancing the lenders trust in the borrower can also be implemented to mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard problems. In the traditional bank-lending markets, banks can use collateral, certified accounts, regular reporting, and even presence of the board of direct
11、ors to enhance the trust in the borrower. However, such mechanisms are difficult to implement in the online environment which will incur a significant transaction cost.To reduce lending risks associated with information asymmetry, current online P2P lending has the following arrangements. First, the
12、 Lending Club screens out any potential high-risk borrowers based on the FICO score. The minimum FICO score to be able to participate is 640. Second, the typical size of the loans produced in this market is small, which is under $35 000 at the Lending Club. Therefore, these loans are essentially mic
13、roloans which pose a relatively small loss in case of default. Third, the market maker offers matchmaking systems which can be used to generate portfolio recommendations and minimize lending risks. Fourth, if a borrower fails to pay, the market maker will report the case to a credit agency and hire
14、a collection agency to collect the funds on behalf of the lender. Although there are certain structures imposed in the online P2P that help to minimize the risk, this form of lending is inherently associated with greater amount of risk compared to the traditional lending.The purpose of this article
15、is to evaluate the credit risk of borrowers from one of the largest P2P platforms in the United States provided by the Lending Club, which help lenders to make more informed decisions about the risk and return efficiency of loans based on the borrowers grade. There are two related research questions
16、 this article will address: (1) What are some of the borrowers characteristics that help determine the default risk? and (2) Is the higher return generated from the riskier borrower large enough to compensate for the incremental risk? Lenders can allocate their investments more efficiently if they k
17、now what characteristics of the borrower affect the default risk. Each borrower is classified by credit grade with corresponding borrowing rate assigned by the Lending Club. To make an efficient allocation, a lender should know whether the higher interest rates set for high-risk borrowers are suffic
18、ient to compensate the lenders for the higher probabilities of a potential loss.Our findings suggest that borrowers with high FICO score, high credit grade, low revolving line utilization and low debt-to-income ratio are associated with low default risk. This finding is consistent with the studies b
19、y Duarte et al. (2012) who report that borrowers with a trustworthy characteristic will have better credit scores but low probability of default. This result also suggests that besides the loan applicants social ties and friendship as reported by Freedman and Jin (2014) and Lin et al. (2013), the fo
20、ur factors discussed above are also important in explaining the default risk. When comparing with US national borrowers, the results show that the Lending Club should continue to screen out the borrowers with lower FICO score and attract the highest FICO score borrowers in order to significantly red
21、uce the default risk. In relating the risk to the return, it shows that higher interest rate charged for the riskier borrower is not significant enough to justify the higher default probability. Our finding here is consistent with the study by Berkovich (2011) who reports that high quality loans off
22、er excess return.II.Literature ReviewThree main streams of research have emerged in response to the growing popularity of P2P lending. The first stream of research examines the reasons for the emergence of online P2P lending. The second stream of research focuses on determining the factors that expl
23、ain the funding success and default risk. The last stream of research investigates the performance of online P2P loan for a given level of the risk.Peer group lending has been emerging in local communities and has attracted the research in this area. Conlin (1999) develops a model to explain the exi
24、stence of peer group micro-lending programmes in the United States and Canada. He finds that peer groups enable fixed costs to be imposed on the entrepreneurs while minimizing the programmes overhead costs. Ashta and Assadi (2008) investigate whether Web 2.0 techniques are integrated to support the
25、advanced social interactions and associations with lower costs for P2P lending. Hulme and Wright (2006) study a case of online P2P lending house, Zopa, in the United Kingdom. They suggest that the emergence of online P2P lending is a direct response to social trends and a demand for new forms of rel
26、ationship in financial sector under the new information age.There is extant literature that identifies the factors determining the funding success and default risk. Using the Canadian micro-credit data, Gomez and Santor (2003) find that group lending offers lower default rates than conventional indi
27、vidual lending does. Study by Iyer et al. (2009) shows that lenders can evaluate one third of credit risk using both hard and soft data about the borrower. Lin et al. (2013) analyse the role of social connections in evaluating credit risk and discover that strong social networking relationship is an
28、 important factor that determines the borrowing success and lower default risk. Lin et al. (2013) further report that applicants friendship could increase the probability of successful funding, lower interest rates on funded loans, and these borrowers are associated with lower ex post default rates
29、at Prosper. The importance of social ties in determining loans funded is also examined by Freedman and Jin (2014). The result shows that borrowers with social ties are more likely to have their loans funded and receive lower interest rates. However, they also find evidence of risks to lenders regard
30、ing borrower participation in social networks.Several other studies examine whether certain borrowers characteristics and personal information determine the success of loan funding and default risk. Herzenstein et al. (2008) show that borrowers financial strength, their listing and publicizing effor
31、ts, and demographic attributes affect likelihood of funding success. Study by Duarte et al. (2012) further argues that borrowers who appear more trustworthy have better credit score with higher probabilities of having their loans funded and default less often. Larrimore et al. (2011) demonstrate tha
32、t borrowers who use extended narratives, concrete descriptions and quantitative words have positive impact on funding success. However, humanizing personal details or loan justifications have negative influences on funding success. Qiu et al. (2012) further reveal that in addition to personal inform
33、ation and social capital, other variables, including loan amount, acceptable maximum interest rate and loan period set by borrowers, significantly in uence the funding success or failure.Galak et al. (2011) further show that lenders tend to favour individual over group borrowers and borrowers who ar
34、e socially proximate to themselves. They also find that lenders prefer the borrowers who are more like themselves in terms of gender, occupation and first name initial. More interestingly, Gonzalez and Loureiro (2014) have similar findings: (1) when perceived age represents competence, attractivenes
35、s has no effect on loan success; (2) when lenders and borrowers are of the same gender, attractiveness might lead to a loan failure (i.e., the beauty is beastly effect) and (3) loan success is sensitive to the relative age and attractiveness of lenders and borrowers. Herzenstein et al. (2011) find t
36、hat herding in the loan auction is positively related to its subsequent performance, that is whether borrowers pay the money back on time.III.DataIn this section, the loan applicants data is first described, followed by loan distribution based on loan purposes, credit grade and loan status and it en
37、ds with the detailed descriptive statistics of the loan applicants. This study uses 61 451 loan applications in the Lending Club from May 2007 to June 2012 obtained from HYPERLINK . Over the study period, the Lending Club lent about $713 million to borrowers. To address the borrowers behaviour in on
38、line P2P lending, we first examine the main reasons for borrowing money from others. Table 1 lists the borrowers self-claimed reasons summarized in the Lending Club. Almost 70% of loan requested are related to debt consolidation or credit card debts with a total loan amount requested of approximatel
39、y $387 million and $108 million, respectively. The number of loan applications for education, renewable energy and vacation contribute less than 1% of total loans with the total loan requested ranging from 1 to 3 million. The borrowers state that their preferences to borrow from the Lending Club are
40、 lower borrowing rate and inability to borrow enough money from credit cards. The second purpose for borrowing is to pay home mortgage or to re-model home.Table 1. Loan distributions by loan purpose (May 2007 -une 2012)Loan pvirpuscNumber uflcansPcr centAniuuntPti cent1 比 ht con solids linn29見以$387
41、333 32554329。丁 214.76J107 904 27515.13Otllur5兩ois547 217 05Q丘腔Home improvement43657.10S51 392 3007.21M aj pr pu“ha5t2網(wǎng)4.7QS3 836 175玨SimMI bu疝y沼2朋5439138 192 4505.36Cor purchase351$13 的 1 525L96Wedding13402.18513 573 3751.90Mud 心駟二1.61346 4001.17Moving7001 SO527 175C.7SHouse6301.03$8 883 801).25531$
42、3 005 3500.42Edu uali nnl4220.69$2 752 7750 39Renewable energyLJ50.22SI 171 5750 16fbial61 451100.00$713 087 55D100.00Notes The data is obtained from 61 451 loan applicants in the Lending Club, HYPERLINK , from May 2007 to June 2012.The loan-seeking persons are asked to provide the reasons for reque
43、sting loans.The Lending Club uses the borrowers FICO credit scores along with other information to assign a loan credit grade ranging from A1 to G5 in descending credit ranks to each loan. The detailed procedure is as follows: after assigning a base score based on FICO ratings, the Lending Club make
44、s some adjustments depending on requested loan amount, number of recent credit inquiries, credit history length, total open credit account, currently open credit accounts and revolving line utilization todetermine the final grade, which in turn determines the interest rate on the loan.Table 2 report
45、s the loan distribution by credit grade. The majority of borrowing requests have grades between A1 and E5. The Highest loan amounts requested are from borrowers withB credit grade, which contribute 29.56% of total amount ofloans requested. The total number of applicants for this B credit grade group
46、 is 18 707, which represents total loans of approximately $210 million. The lowest loan amounts requested are from borrowers with the lowest G credit grade which accounts for 1.53% of total loans. There are only 608 loan applicants for this lowest credit rating G group and it represents approximatel
47、y $11 million in total loan value. According to the Lending Clubs policy, a loan credit grade is used to determine the interest rate and the maximum amount of money that a borrower can request. The higher the loan grade, the lower the interest rate. A borrowing request with a low grade renders a hig
48、her interest rate as a compensation for a high risk held by lenders. Table 2. Loans distribution by credit grades (May 2007 -une 2012)Credit gradeGradeNumber of loans?cr cent AmounT of loan provided)Pct cent7 (Lowest nsk?AlA2A3 A47 (Lowest nsk?AlA2A3 A4A5 6R1咫 R4H35.ClC2 C3C4 C54151)U4 D5JElE2 三E4E5
49、2FJF2F4 F5 (Highe沆施GJG2 GJ C4 5Tub IS ICSM 996 1252 103 81$18 704 (H)02 624.27S22 432 6503.156 99招工1時(shí)ft756.066.26S3S 652 &505424.66$29 539 3754.:45.2 J$34 522 4754.47.H6$56 153 5757.R76 21$44 104 15。6J9相看491 2006.525.70$4。5 打 1005.685.32$非 705 JOO5.443.50S23 674 600S323.02$19 827 9002.782.K74卅附。2.72
50、2泅$16 43 4752.303,3024 214 4253寓2.97$24 07R 7003.382.?5$21 62 K 6253.032 21$19 467 5252.731.87$17 305 7752.431.71$16 252 2252.2K1 431.24$Ml?(1 94$12 fi5lI.X01.10$12 147 0251.700.86$9 837 5751.380.69$7 777 7501.090.52$5 94H 網(wǎng)O.XJ0.4$4 941 8750.690.34$4 310 2150.60OJflU 67 D 90(10.5 J0 21J2 337 3250.3
51、0.14$1 522 8250.210 17$1 886 5250.26U.I6$1 3H6H500.19i( .00S7H (M7 55&100.00Notes The Lending Club uses the borrowers, FICO credit scores along with other information to classify a loan from Grade A1 to G5 in descending credit risk. Therefore, A1 credit grade represents the highest credit quality/lo
52、w-risk borrowers, whereas G5 credit grade represents the lowest credit quality/ high-risk borrowers. Total amount of loans requested as a percentage of total loan is 19.35% for credit grade group A, 29.56% for B, 19.94% for C, 14.84% for D, 10.15% for E, 4.59% for F and 1.53% for G.Finally, Panel A
53、of Table 3 shows the loan status for all the loan requests on 20 July 2012. Overall, the default rate is 4.60% with total losses of approximately $29 million. Another 2.45% of total loan requests which constitute $18.6 million could be potentially lost because the borrowers are late in making paymen
54、t within 30 days or 120 days and not paying the normal instalments. 17.98% of the loans are fully paid with an approximate value of $108 million. The $557 million loans are in current status account for 74.91% of total loans. Naturally, loans with a lower grade demonstrate a higher default rate. The
55、refore, study on risk management on P2P lending is relevant for the lenders to optimize their investment portfolios. Panel B of Table 3 reports the loan status for the matured loans. The overall loss rate is much higher for matured loans. Among 4904 matured loans, 914 loans are charged-off, which re
56、present 18.6%. The total loss is $5.5 million which represents 13% of all matured loans amount. Less than 1% of the matured loans are late in terms of making payment with the unpaid balance of approximately $27 000. 80.77% or $33 million of matured loans are fully paid.Table 3. Loan distribution by
57、the loan status (May 2007-June 2012)Panel A: AH loansNumber of bansPei centAniouilLPer ceni4,634tl$29 254 9754.1必620l.OOROS7 47R 4501,O4R7Performing payment plan21$3 045 m0.4271Late 16=30 days)1720.279951 927 6500.2703in gnic已 periodU.794116 125 325Current46 039749199S557 351 S2578,1604Fully paidI 0
58、5317,9867$107 903 65015.BJ9Total61 451100.0000$713 087 550100.0000Panel 1: MaTurcd loarisNumber of loansiPer centAmonnrFer centUmpnid principal列 41&637XS8 764 70020.6742S5 526 339.5Laic四0.5914$329 3250.776SS27 140.64Fully paid3961SO.VTORS33 300 42578.5490foulIW,O(XM)姆 450IW.WW$5 553 480.15Table 4 re
59、ports the general characteristics and credit history of the online P2P loan applicants from the Lending Club. Based on our sample of 61 451 loan applicants, the average monthly interest charged on a loan is 12.34%. On average, 471 days passed from the issue date of the loan. The average credit grade
60、 of a borrower is 25, which corresponds to credit category between B and C. The average size of a typical loan is $11 604 and the average monthly payment is $351. The borrower in general pays back $4384 a month and has $7873 left to be paid. The average ratio of the remaining balance to total loans
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